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*:pand upon the

o: tn< OaL>e (;i~ appellant-plaint . i,
; iragraphs xn

». s ; K IO: wni.cn,

reasons hereafter o I i udcd to, +~he resp'..;-drjiselective and misleading.

rta

are

The parties are hereafter referred

to as in the lower coin l
Plaintiff commenced this action in Fourth

,s

' "'""•"" i 'I:

Com: i in • md for Duchesne County when the defendants, v . th •
the assistance of the Duchesne County ;.!hoi: 1 t. i: , requires u
c o u n i-.-rder as a condition to permitting plaintiff to enter
upon then: .land.

( \< ,188)

Such an action was commenced and

a temporary injunction, issued with n

, together with

an Order to Show Cause why a permanent injunction should not
be entered, was set and heard before the Honorable Allen B.
Sorensen on January 28, 1974,

(R 17, .1 8 and UK))

Following Lhe

hearing, the Court: noted that, since a bond or undertaking in
the amount of $l>|f 000 had been posted and n check payable from
the plaintiff to the defendants In. the amount of $3, SOD was
on deposit w.ith the; clerk of the court, the restraining order
would remain in effect.

(\< 4t and lt>">)

Specifically, in the

said order or Memorandum Decision, the Court said, "AT I issues
•I

touching on damages are reserved for trial of the action on
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its merits.11

(R 46) At the hearing before Judge Sorensen,

it was admitted that the access road to the proposed wellsite had already been cut and fully installed by the plaintiff
before defendants were ever heard in the matter.
129)

(R 128 and

The well-site at the time of the hearing was still under

construction.
The following September, defendants made a motion
for an injunction and restraining order supported with an affidavit (R 47-50) stating that plaintiff was constructing a natural
gas pipeline across the surface of the subject property to the
defendants' damage and outside the terms of its restraining
order.

While the motion for injunction was pending and before

the day set for the hearing arrived, the gas pipeline was
installed by the plaintiff as admitted by counsel for the
plaintiff at the time of trial.

(R 145) Accordingly, the

motion was continued without date and counsel instructed to
follow Rule 20.

(R 52)

Rather than submit the merits of the

laying of the pipeline as a separate item under Rule 20, the
defendants filed an Answer and Counterclaim and reincorporated
those issues and its affirmative defenses in their Answer and
Counterclaim.

(R 53-56)

In the said Counterclaim, the

defendants pled trespass, eminent domain, and further asked
for damages for unreasonable and excessive use of the surface
interest by the plaintiff.

The matter proceeded to trial on
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

April 14, 1975, before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock.

It

must be noted that the lease under which plaintiff was proceeding was attached to the original Complaint on file (R 4)
and said copy attached to the Complaint is manifestly illegible.
As noted from the transcript of the trial, (R 170-172) the
Court at a preliminary pre-trial ordered plaintiff to furnish
a legible copy of the lease to the court and counsel prior to
the trial of the matter.

Said copies were furnished on the

morning of the trial of the matter.

Accordingly, a fourth

theory was advanced by the defendants at the trial and leave
asked by the defendants to amend the pleadings to conform with
that theory, to-wit, that the defendants were entitled to
recover crop damages under the terms of the lease.

Permission

so to amend was granted by the Court at the conclusion of the
trial, (R 350) and the Memorandum Decision of the Court and
later the formal Findings and Conclusions granted relief to
the defendants, both under the language of the lease for damage
to growing crops and for the pleading of excessive and unreasonable location of the road site, resulting to damage to 15 acres
of irrigated pasture of defendants.

(R 64-71)

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court found that the 5.88 acres occupied
by the access road and the drilling site had growing crops
within the meaning of paragraph 10 of the lease and that said
road and well-site permanently and effectively denied defendants
any use of the land, resulting in damages of $5,292. In addition
the Court found that the plaintiff, in constructing the access
road where it did,

unreasonably interferred with the pre-

existing irrigation of the surface by defendants, although
there were non-interferring and reasonable ways available to
it which would have allowed defendants to continue their established use of the surface; and the Court found that there were
no reasonable alternative surface irrigation uses available
to the defendants to continue to use said surface productively
and determined that the resulting damage to the defendants was
$11,250.

The Court further awarded interest to run from the

date of occupancy by the plaintiff.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL \
The decision of the lower court is amply supported
and justified by the facts and is in accordance with the applicable law and should accordingly be affirmed.
4
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since the plaintiff's Statement of Facts alludes
exclusively to that testimony which supports its position on
appeal and ignores the considerablef credible and probative
evidence which the lower court considered and upon which its
decision was based, the defendants respectfully call to the
court's attention the following facts:
Defendant, Anthon Rust, and his wife, Onaf were the
surface owners of three 40-acre parcels of land situated in an
L-shape in the northeast corner of Section 22, Township 1 South,
Range 4 Westf Uintah Special Meridian, located in Duchesne
County.

(R 66)

Exhibit 2 received in evidence was a warranty

deed for the two 40-acre parcels adjoining each other along the
east boundary line of said Section 22 and on which the well-site
and across whiqh the access road complained of were built.
Exhibit P-4, also received into evidence, shows that the wellsite was located in the southwest corner of the north 40 of the
said 80 acres described in said warranty deed, and that the
access road bisects the north and south 40's effectively as it
runs east-west from the county road into the well-site.

On at

least three different occasions prior to the constrution of the
well-site and the road, defendant, Anthon Rust, requested the
agents of plaintiff not to bring the access road into the wellsite from the east, but rather to construct it running south
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to the well-site from the county road along the north border
of the subject property.

(R 143-5, 147-51 and R 163)

The most

explicit testimony in that regard comes from Mr. Charles Rich,
"heavy equipment manager" of plaintiff:
"Q

(R182)

What was the discussion about the road?

A
I told him that probably it would come so they would
have to put the location there. He said, "If you do come
in, put the road in from the north."
Q

Did he say why?

A

So it wouldn't go through his hay field.

Q

Did he give any other reason?

A

Not that I recall.

Q

Did he discuss irrigation at all?

A
I believe he did, yes, that it would break up the
pattern of his irrigation.
Q
And that his irrigation pattern generally was north
and south?
A

Yes.

Q
And that the whole 80 acres was covered by the same
irrigation system, correct?
A
Not the whole 80 acres, as I recall, it, but his
whole hay field, the hay field was talking about was
covered,

r

Q
And the pasture below that hay field was irrigated
pasture, was it not?
A

Yes. Uh-huh.

Q

You can identify irrigated pasture when you see it?

A

Oh, yes.

-6-
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Q

And you were aware that water comes from the north?

A

Yes. North and south,

Q

And you are also aware that it tilts to the west?

A

Right

Q
And therefore if you put the road in from the north
you'd be putting the road in where it wouldn't interfere
with that irrigation pattern, is that also correct?
A

Yes."

(R 228-230)

Also from the testimony of Tom Wheatly, Jr., an independent contractor

who acquired rights of way for plaintiff, is

similar testimony:
"Q
It had not been determined, but don't recall Mr.
Rust telling you that he wanted you to bring it in from
the north? Do you remember discussing that at all with
him?
A

Oh, yes.

Q
And his reason for that was that the irrigation pattern
rather than*from north to south on that 80 acres, wasn't it?
Do you remember that discussion?
A

Right.

Q
And if you ran a road across from the east you'd be
interrupting that whole irrigation pattern for the lower
40, the south 40, isn't that also correct?
A

Right."

(R179-18Q)

There is considerable additional testimony from Mr. Rust
and from Marcellus Palmer, defendants' appraisal witness, that
the irrigation pattern on the 80~acres in question was generally
from north to south.

(R 14 5-146)

* Counsel for defendants assert the word "than"
should have been transcribed "runs".
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It was generally also agreed by all witnesses that in
the 80 acres,there were approximately 15 acres of hay growing
which had been planted by Mr. Rust, which 15 acres ran along
the east county road and was situated both in the north and the
south 40-acre parcels and that the balance of said 80 acres was
in natural and planted range grasses.

(R 267-268)

Mr. Rust

further testified that putting in the east-west road bisected
his hayfield and cut off irrigation water to approximately 20
acres of irrigated pasture in the south 40-acre plot.
283 and 285)

(R 256,

This was corroborated by Mr. Palmer and both

testified that the only way to get water to those 20^acres
would be by some pumping system, which, Palmer testified,
would be economically unfeasible.

(R 283)

Both Mr. Rust

and Mr. Palmer testified that the subirrigation waters, or
those waters that would flow below the surface of the land
naturally from the north 40 to the south 40 acre parcels, were
effectively cut off by the east-west road since the compacting
of the same by the heavy oil rigs and trucks repeatedly coming
across the road prevented the otherwise natural subsurface
flow of water.

(R 251-253, R 282 and R 284)

Anthon Rust testified from the time of acquiring the
subject parcel, in addition to plowing and planting
acres of hay,
of his pastures

<

the 15

that he seeded and reseeded every four years all
with grasses, alfalfa and clovers.

-8-
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(R 267-8)

i

Exhibit P-4, prepared by plaintiff and to which most of the
witnesses had reference, shows on its face a division between
"hay meadow" and "pasture" and a dotted line saying "division
of fields" showing that the "property damage area" constituting
the well-site was located in the irrigated pasture portion of
the north 40-acre piece. Mr. Palmer testified that the irrigated pastures contained "partially native and partially seeded
species of grass and legumes."

(R 276)

As it relates to the

well-site and the access road, both Mr. Rust and Mr. Palmer
testified that the crops heretofore growing thereon were not
only destroyed for the year in which the construction took
place, but the ground had been so materially compacted and
altered as to make the whole 5.88 acres unproductive permanently.
(R 260,284 & 291)

The plaintiff's own appraisal witness, Mr.

Grant Gerber, stated that the irrigated pasture was "brome
grass and orchard and alfalfa mainly...I mean tame grass is
in it."

(R 323)

He also stated:

"Q
Did you take into account the fact that after the
drill site or if the well should cease to produce this
property would return to use by Mr. Rust, was there
any calculations made?
A
No, I didn't. I just considered the property
was gone forever." (R 331)
And again:
"A
...The ground that was taken out, I'd have to concur
with Mr. Palmer that it just doesn't look like they could
ever put it back the way that it was before, and, therefore, it was lost." (R 331 and 332)
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M4 (

- Reference at this point should also be made to Exhibit

D-6, which shows recorded on the backside thereof the pasture
land north of the well-site indicating that in the rear, dirt
had been mounded up to make, in effect, an earthen platform on
which the well-site and tank battery are now located, which
Palmer testified could not economically be made productive
in the future.

(R 284)

Also as it relates to the productivity

of the land still irrigated as opposed to that which is no
longer able to be watered, see Exhibits D-6, D-8 and D-9.
Plaintiff, both in its Statement of Fact and Argument,
asserts that there is no evidence in the record suggesting that
the plaintiff could have located the access road in some reasonably alternative location.

In that connection, plaintiff over-

looks the testimony of its own witness who did, in fact, oversee
and construct the actual road, Mr. Charles Rich, who testified
in that connection as follows:

*

11

.- ^

Q
And if in fact you had run a road down the edge of
his hay field on his higher ground, it would have still
been able to connect at a well-site, wouldn't it?
A

Y e s .

.-

-

•.:,••'

Q
It wouldn't have required nine thousand dollars
worth of fill?
A

No.

Q

You didn't ever explore that possibility, did you?

A

No.

I just —

See, that wasn't my job."

-10-
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(R 236)

In the same series of questions, Mr. Rich testified that even
if he had put the road in from the county road on the north
down "the fence line" which abuts the west boundary in Exhibit
P-4 along the section line adjacent to the "property damage
area" , that the cost of the road would have been approximately
$9,300.

(R 235 and 236)

Contrary to the assertions of plain-

tiff of the great expense and inconvenience in building a road
in from the north, its own principal witness, Mr. Reese,
admitted under cross-examination as follows:
"Q
And your primary consideration in locating the site
where you did and the road where you did I believe you
said was because it was the shortest distance, quoteunquote, is that correct?
A

That is correct."

(R 310)

In short, therefore, his principal concern was not the expense
of fill, but rather "the shortest distance."
In its Brief, appellant repeatedly complains that the
court below erred in trying the case as though the matter were
an eminent domain proceeding.
should be noted:

In that connection, two things

First, counsel for the plaintiff entered no

objection at any time in the course of the trial to the valuation testimony introduced by the defendants, either through
Mr. Rust or Mr. Palmer.

Second, the following comment by counsel

at the outset of the trial is relevant:
"MR. MC KEACHNIE: Your Honor, our preference
would be for us to proceed briefly on our claim and allow
the defendant to proceed as in a condemnation case.
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THE COURT: All right.

Any objection to that,

Mr. Madsen?
MR. MADSEN: As though it were a condemnation
case, you say?
MR. MC KEACHNIE: As if it were."

(R 170)

j

Plaintiff's own appraisal witness, Mr. Grant Gerber, in
large measure corroborated Mr. Palmer's theory of value, even
though his numbers differed substantially.

In the court

below, defendants pointed out in their Brief to that court
that Mr. Gerber's testimony was not credible for two reasons:
First, he had only inspected the subject property after the
improvements were put in (three days before the trial) and he
had no first-hand knowledge of or about the irrigation patterns
on the property prior to the location of the well-site or the
building of the road.

And further, Mr. Gerber represented in

his original direct testimony that he was using the "market
data" approach to value, (R 318) but then admitted on crossexamination that he had, in fact, collected no comparable sales
and used no market data.

(R 335)

Over the objection of the

defendants, Mr. Gerber went on to attempt to pass judgment or
impeach the comparable sales used by Mr. Palmer, which counsel
for defendants maintain was error.

But the Findings of Fact

\

and Conclusions of Law and Judgment of the lower court would
seem to indicate that no great weight was placed on Mr. Gerberfs
testimony by the trial court, and so the claim of error is

-12-
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^

not seriously urged here.
The Findings, Conclusions and Judgment of the lower
court were amply substantiated by the admitted testimony from
both Mr. Rust and Mr. Palmer.

Specifically, Mr. Rust testified

that his damages to the 5.88 acres of crop land taken or made
permanently unproductive was $11,760 and that the change of
use from irrigated pasture to dry pasture for the 20-acre parcel on the lower 40-acre tract was $33,000.

(R 261) Mr.

Palmer's testimony regarding the 5.88 acres made permanently
nonproductive was $8,204, (R 284) and that the damages occassioned by the change of use of the 20-acre parcel from irrigated
to dry pasture was $25,000.

(R 286)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED
ACRES TAKEN BY PLAINTIFF FOR A
ROAD CONTAINED "GROWING CROPS"
MEANING OF PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE
LEASE.

THAT THE 5.8 8
WELL-SITE AND
WITHIN THE
OIL AND GAS

The oil and gas lease involved in this action, which
was admitted in evidence as Exhibit P-3, contains the following provision at paragraph 10 thereof:
"10.
LESSEE shall have the right to use, free of
cost, gas, oil and water found on said land for its
operations thereon except water from the wells of
LESSOR. When required by LESSOR, LESSEE shall bury
pipe lines below plow depth and shall pay for damages
directly and immediately caused by its operations to
growing crops theretofore planted on said land."
By virtue thereof, the plaintiff assumed the burden of
paying "damages" to growing crops.
The testimony in this action was that the land taken
by the defendants for the well-site and for the road was irrigated pasture land (some of the road was actually in hay), and
the testimony further was that the defendants periodically
seeded this area with various grasses for cattle grazing.
(R 276 and 268)
Does irrigated pasture consisting of, as the evidence
shows, grasses, alfalfa and clovers (R 268) (grasses and legumes,
as another witness put it)(R 276) cared for (R 343) and periodically seeded by the owner of the surface constitute a "growing

-14-
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crop" within the meaning of the lease?

We submit that the

authorities answer this question in the affirmative.
We refer the court to the following statement found in
38 Am Jur 2d, Gas and Oil, Section 118, which states as follows:
"The fact that certain plants are generally considered to be a part of the realty has been said
to have little, if any, bearing on the question
whether they fall within the purview of an oil and
gas lease provision requiring the lessee to pay
for damage casued by his operations to growing
crops on the land. Cultivated pecan trees bearing
nuts of good quality that are harvested by the
owner have been held to be growing crops within
the purview of such a provision. The same is
true of King's Ranch bluestem grass, a perennial
plant, lespedeza, an annual reseeding plant, and
clovers, legumes and grasses that are seeded for
either pasturage, meadow, or seed crop purposes."
The case of Cities Service Gas Company v. Christian, 340
Pac 2d 9 29, an Oklahoma case, decided in 19 59, presented a situation where the court was called upon to construe a pipeline
lease which provided that:
"Grantee shall also pay reasonable damages to
growing crops, fences or improvements occasioned
in laying, repairing or removing all lines, drips
and valves...Grantee shall bury pipeline below
plow depth."
The court held at page 934-5 of the decision that the phrase
"growing crops" should be "given a broad and not a narrow construction", and the court held that the bluestem grass, rye and
vech, and rye and wheat represented "growing crops" within the
aforesaid language of the easement.

The case appears to stand
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for the proposition that no distinction can be made between
annuals and perennials, as such, but that, rather, the meaning
of the word "crop" depends on the facts of the particular case.
The court further held in that case that certain native pecan
trees which had been destroyed by the pipeline company were "a
growing crop".

Even though they were native trees, the court

stated at page 936 of the decision:
"Under the facts of this case, we are of the
opinion that the native pecan trees in controversy represented the growing crop or improvement within the provisions of the easements..."
The same court in a later case of Superior Oil Co. v.
Griffin, 357 Pac 2d 987, 87 ALR 2d 224 (1960), held at page 991:
"We are of the opinion that where clovers, legumes
or grasses are seeded for either pasturage, meadow,
or seed crop purposes, the resulting crop should be
treated as a growing crop within the purview of the
provisions of an oil and gas lease to the effect that
damages will be paid for damage to or destruction of
growing crops."
The court further stated that the pecan trees involved
in that action, although they may have originally been natural
in their origin, had been, nevertheless, thinned by the plaintiff, and he had likewise pruned the trees, cleaned up dead
leaves and otherwise taken care of the same to produce a pecan
crop, and the court held that the pecan trees likewise came
within the phrase "growing crops", and the court stated at
page 991:
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"In view of the effort and labor so expended, the
pecan crop cannot be said to have resulted solely
from the power of nature."
In the case of Frankfort Oil Co. v. Abramsy 413 Pac 2d
190 (Colo. 1966), the court held that "natural prairie grass"
was a "growing crop" within the meaning of the oil lease provision requiring compensation for damage to growing crops.
We think the lease provision is clear.

If ambiguous,

however, it should be noted that normally an instrument should
be construed against the party who prepares the same.

If the

oil companies desire to limit the meaning of the words "growing
crops" to that contended for the plaintiff, it is well within
their ability to revise their lease agreements to clearly so
provide.

In the absence thereof, the said documents should be

construed in favor of the land owner.
It should be noted that the lease inures to the benefit
of defendants as third party beneficiaries.

In the aforesaid

Frankfort Oil Co. v. Abrams case, it was held that where the
mineral rights were severed from the surface, that the owner
of the surface rights was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of a lease entered into between the lessee oil company
and the owner of the mineral estate, lessor, as a third party
beneficiary.
In the light of the authorities, plaintiff's contention
that "growing crops" means annuals only is untenable. Further,
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its apparent position that an oil company can proceed with
total iinmunity in the winter since there is nothing growing,
would permit the most outrageous conduct by oil companies;
and it cannot be supposed that the parties intended such a
result by the phrase ''growing crops". On the contrary, the
finding of the lower court is in accord with basic notions
of fair play and is fully supported by the law and by the
facts.
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POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE PROPER TEST IN
DETERMINING DAMAGES TO GROWING CROPS WHERE
THE CROP LAND HAS BEEN EFFECTIVELY AND
PERMANENTLY TAKEN BY PLAINTIFF.
The trial court used the correct measure of damages for
destruction to growing crops.

The cases which we have cited

above in Point I, to-wit, the Cities Service Gas Co. case and
the Superior Oil Co. case, have announced a rule which we
think applicable in the instant case.

In Cities Service Gas

Co., supra, the court held at page 9 37 that the rule for measuring damages is as follows:
"The rule for measuring damages arising from injury
or loss of trees is the value of the premises upon
which the trees grew immediately prior to the
destruction and the value immediately thereafter."
In the Superior Oil Co. case, the court held at page 991 in
sustaining the judgment of the lower court that:
"There was competent evidence that the value of
the farm immediately prior to the crops being
destroyed was $8,000 and that the value thereof
immediately following said destruction was
$7,000."
In the case of Diamond Shamrock Corporation v. Phillips, an
Arkansas case found at 511 SW 2d 160 (1974), the court held at
page 164:
"Since the damages to the homesite were permanent, the
measure of damages is the difference in the before and
after value of the property."
The same measure of damages was applied in the Frankfort Oil v.
Abrams case cited in Point I above.
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This same measure of damages should apply in this case.
It is defendants' position that the 5.88 acres containing
the well-site and access road were, in effect, taken by plaintiff.
In support we cite the position of plaintiff's supervisor, Mr.
(R 305)
Reese, in saying that plaintiff had "bought the road"/(and, by
implication, "bought" the well-site), together with the testimony of Mr. Gerber corroborating defendants' appraiser, Marcellus
Palmer, that the well-site and road never will be able to be
economically returned to pasture land constitutes a "taking". (R284)
In Mr. Gerber's words, "The property was gone forever." (R 331) The
only evidence the court has before it is that 5.88 acres have
been effectively and permanently taken by the plaintiff and the
defendants have been damaged the full fair market value of said
5.88 acres.

Plaintiff's contention that the trial court applied

the wrong measure of damages is without merit.

The reasonable

value of the 5.88 acres as found by the trial court is well
within the testimony, and, in fact, plaintiff does not dispute
that fact.
The rule contended for by the plaintiff that the value
of one year's crop only should be considered by the court might
have some merit in a situation where an oil company destroyed
one year's crop in laying a pipeline or the like, but then
left the land to be used by the surface owner in subsequent
years.

In this case, plaintiff has not done that.
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Plaintiff

has effectively, as the evidence overwhelmingly shows, permanently deprived defendants of this land.

It can never be

economically used again by the defendants.

To limit the

defendants to the value of one year's crop would be grossly
unfair.

The aforesaid case of Cities Service Gas Co. v.

Christian holds that the before and after test is proper for
permanent damage, and the value of a particular crop where the
damages are only temporary.
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POINT III, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT IN LOCATING
THE ROAD WHERE IT DID, PLAINTIFF UNREASONABLY INTERFERRED WITH DEFENDANTS1 PRE-EXISTING USE OF THE
SURFACE, SINCE THERE WERE NON-INTERFERRING AND
REASONABLE WAYS AVAILABLE TO PLAINTIFF TO LOCATE
SAID ROAD WITHOUT SUCH INTERFERENCE, WHEREAS NO
REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE WAS AVAILABLE TO DEFENDANTS,
AND THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS THE DAMAGES AS
FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT.
It appears that there is considerable authority in this
country for the proposition that where the surface rights are
separated from mineral rights, the mineral estate is the dominant estate in the sense that the owner of the mineral estate
is said to have a right to use so much of the surface as is
"reasonably necessary" to develop the mineral estate.

This

position seems particularly to have been developed by the courts
in the oil country of Oklahoma, Texas, and surrounding states.
In times past, some courts gave the phrase "reasonably necessary"
a very one-sided interpretation tending to give the oil companies
almost unlimited control over the surface.

This may have seemed

appropriate at a time when there was much wide open space and
where surface areas are of minimal value, such as wild range
land, etc., although, even in the "golden era" of the oil and
mining barons in which this rule evolved, the courts adopted
the rule that the surface owner was the dominant estate as
against the owner of the mineral estate when it came to support
of the surface, and the courts have held that the owner of the
mineral estate, mining under a given surface, has a duty to
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see that the surface does not sink or otherwise become damaged.
In support of this position, we cite the case of Evans Fuel Co.
v. Leyda, 236 Pac 1023 (Colo. 1925).
This frequently one-sided interpretation of the rule of
reasonable necessity appears to be no longer suited to the
modern world.

As surface areas become cultivated and more popu-

lated, the conflict between surface owners and mineral owners
has increased, and although oil people like to talk a lot about
the rule, as they see it, they are nonetheless, it appears,
acutely embarrassed by the manner in which it has at times been
applied.

It appears that they go about, as in the present case,

offering surface owners money for "damages" to the surface in
one breath and claiming in the next that they are doing this
only for "public relations" and that they have no legal duty
to do so.

It is almost as though they are saying, "We realize

that this is a bad rule and is grossly unfair and that you should
not be subjected, Mr. Surface Owner, to having your surface interest
damaged, but that is the way the law is, and you, therefore, have
to accept our terms or get nothing at all."
it is truly a sad state of affairs.

If this is the law,

So far as we have been able

to determine, the Supreme Court of Utah has never ruled on this
matter.

We maintain the rule in its one-sided form is out of

step with current trends and needs.
The courts of the states of Texas and Oklahoma, in the
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opinions which are hereinafter cited, in a liberalized application of the rule of reasonable necessity have led the way
toward a more just and fair (and incidentally economically
more sound) application of the rule by including within the
meaning of the words "reasonable necessity" the idea of a
balancing of the rights of the mineral and surface owner,
which has been called by some the rule of "reasonable alternatives" .
In a number of areas, Utah appears to be already
committed to the view that the proper approach is a balancing
of interests.

For example, in the area of eminent domain, this

principle has long been established in Utah.

In Section 78-34-5,

Utah Code Annotated, 19 53, it provides:
"In all cases where land is required for public
use, the person, or his agent, in charge of such
use may survey and locate the same; but it must
be located in the manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the
least private injury, . . . "
(emphasis added)
That the above language applies to easements as well as
fee takings was demonstrated in the case of Adamson v. Brockbank
(1947) 112 Ut 52, 185 Pac 2d 264.

In treating the question of

easements by implication, the court said:
"The various states have adopted different degrees of
necessity, but the tendency in recent decisions is
toward the concept that no more than a reasonable
necessity is required. Cases in this jurisdiction
prior to the case of Alcorn v. Reading seem to follow
this principle. Such principles as "absolute necessity"
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and "indispensable necessity" have yielded to the rule
that the necessity requisite to the creation of an
easement by implication is sufficient if it is a
"reasonable necessity"• (See 17 Am Jur 943) If this
test is applied, the rule of necessity in water cases
is the same as in other cases . . . To the extent that
the case of Alcorn v. Reading holds there can be no
easement by implied grant because of the right to
condemn, it is overruled. The true test is the
reasonable necessity existing therefor, and we
reaffirm this principle. If an alternate way permits a grantee to make use of his land at little
or no cost, the availability of this means might
be a factor in determining the necessity of the
easement. (Empasis added)
See also Watkins v. Simonds, 11 Ut 2d 46, 354 Pac 2d
852 (1960).
We also cite the case of Sanford v. University of Utah,
26 Ut 2d 285, 488 Pac 2d 741 (1971).

As to the permissible

use of surface of realty by adjacent land owners, the Supreme
Court of Utah there adopted the rule of reasonable use.

The

Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and stated the
rule as follows at page 289:
"The trial court, in effect, in its rulings and
instructions adopted the rule of "reasonable use":
"each possessor (of land) is legally privileged to
make a reasonable use of his land, even though the
flow of surface waters is altered thereby and
causes some harm to others, but incurs liability
when his harmful interference with the flow of
surface waters is unreasonable."
In a section of its Brief entitled Background on Applicable
Law, plaintiff has collected a number of cases which it presents
as setting forth the applicable law.

Many of these cases, we

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-25

think, demonstrate the one-sided application of the "reasonable necessity'1 rule.

None, we think, involve a fact situation

which is presented by the instant case concerning"reasonable
alternatives".

All of the cases are prior to 1970, and plain-

tiff totally omits therefrom a consideration of the current
trend of the cases away from the harsh application of the
"reasonable necessity" rule.

It is this trend since 1970 which

we feel to be the more enlightened approach.

These cases are

illustrated by the case of Getty Oil v. Jones, 470 SW 2d 618,
53 ALR 3d 1, (Tx 1971), which is the case the trial court
followed in reaching its decision in this case.
As recent enlightened applications of the "reasonable
necessity" rule in oil and gas cases, we refer the court first
to the case of Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, supra*

In that case,

the court refused to apply the rule that the owner of the
mineral estate could use the surface in any manner which was
beneficial to him (which appears to be the rule which is urged
by the plaintiff).

The court in effect held in that case that

it is now the policy of the law to balance the interests of the
mineral estate

with those of the surface estate, thereby recog-

nizing that society has an interest in both estates and the full
development thereof, and that in the modern world, it is not fair
or proper to give either one an undue advantage over the other.
The court stated at page 6 (53 ALR 3d) that:
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. « . where there is an existing use by the surface
owner which would otherwise be precluded or impaired,
and where under the established practices in the
industry there are alternatives available to the
lessee whereby the minerals can be recovered, the
rules of reasonable usage of the surface may require
the adoption of an alternative by the lessee."
(Emphasis added)
In short, the court held that reasonable necessity includes
consideration of reasonable alternatives.

(Inconvenience to

surface owner alone is not controlling; neither is it a matter
of balancing harm or inconvenience between surface and mineral.)
The test seems to be this:

There must be a determination that

under all the circumstances the particular use of the surface
by the mineral owner

is not reasonably necessary.

This situ-

ation exists where the surface use is not reasonably necessary
because there are non-interferring and reasonable ways available to the mineral owner which would allow the surface owner
to continue his established use of the surface, and that the
alternatives available to the surface owner are not reasonable.
Thus, in the Getty case, the owner of the mineral estate did
not have an unrestricted right to use the surface in any manner
which was most advantageous to him, which is the position which
plaintiff in this case urges upon the court, but, rather, that
the owner of the mineral interests has a duty to act reasonably
and fairly as to the surface owner.

In the Getty case, the

court held that there was a reasonable alternative available
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to the owner of the mineral lease, which, had he employed it,
would not have destroyed the irrigation procedures of the surface owner, even though to have used the alternative method
would have necessitated additional expense on the part of the
oil company.

The additional expense which the court indicated

the oil company should have incurred was upwards of $17,000.
We also wish to call the attention of the court to the
case of Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, supra.

In that

case, the defendant oil company was specifically requested
not to locate the oil well on the area of the plaintiff's property where he intended to build a house.

Nevertheless, during

his absence in California, the oil company came in and drilled
a well in that location.

In the lower court, the action was

tried to a jury and the jury found that the actions of the oil
company were not reasonable and awarded damages. On appeal
the Supreme Court of Arkansas sustained the lower court judgment and held that there was evidence to sustain the finding
of the jury that the action of the defendant oil company was
not reasonable in locating the oil well in the site where it
located it.

The court approved the Getty case and adopted the

doctrine of reasonable usage of the surface as stated therein
and took the rule further in citing an earlier Arkansas case
at page 163, to-wit, Martin v. Dale, 21 SW 2d 428 (1929),
which held that the driller of an oil well had a right to
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ingress and egress, but in exercising that right, "it was his
duty to do so in the manner least injurious to his grantor..."
(Emphasis added)
We further desire to refer the court to the case of
Humble Oil v. West, 508 SW 2d 81^^ which is a 1974 Texas case.
In that case, the court again discussed the matter of adjusting
the relative rights between the surface owner and the mineral
owner and confirmed its decision in the Getty case, supra, and
the following portion of that decision (page 818) we feel, is
particularly revealing:
"It is manifest that the interests of the parties
have come into conflict and are not fully compatible. Thus, we have again the recurring
problem of adjusting correlative rights. The
factual context is unique and there is no
directly controlling precedent; however, this
Court has led the way in conciliating conflicts
between owners of the surface and of the mineral
rights, and in requiring reasonable accommodations
between them." (Emphasis added)
The court in the Humble Oil case at page 818 made the
following observation in reference to its prior decision in the
case of Acker v. Guinn, a 1971 case found at 464 SW 2d 348,
to-wit:
"In Acker v. Guinn, supra, we affirmed that it
is not ordinarily contemplated in mineral leases
or deeds that the utility of the surface will be
destroyed or substantially impaired by the uses
made of the surface for the production of
minerals."
We submit that it is from this premise that the Getty
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case and the Humble Oil case proceed, and we feel that it is the
principle upon which defendants place major reliance in this
action, namely, that at the time the lease involved in this case
was executed, the parties certainly did not intend nor contemplate that the surface would be substantially impaired or
destroyed and that when the lessee, contrary to that intention,
does damage or impair surface uses, then compensation to the
surface owner is appropriate and should be awarded.
An excellent survey of the Getty case and subsequent
developments is found in the South Texas Law Journal, Volume 13,
at page 269 (1972).

We cite from the summarizing paragraph

thereof as follows:
(

"The majority holding in Sun Oil v. Whitaker, when
viewed in the perspective of its 4-man dissent,
Acker v. Guinn and Getty v. Jones, will probably
not stand the test of time. Based on sound public
policy, the flow of the law seems to necessitate
a finding in favor of Jones and Whitaker. If a
man has only one way to make his land productive,
and another man has several proven ways of making
his land productive, one of which will exclude
the other man's use, it seems to the benefit of
society to let both men use their estates in land
to the fullest extent."
The evidence adduced at the trial clearly established

that the placement of the road by the plaintiff where it did
was not "reasonably necessary" for the reason that noninterferring and reasonable ways were available to the plaintiff which would have allowed the defendants to continue their
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pre-existing use of the surface, and that the alternatives
to the defendants-were unreasonable, in fact, non-existent.
The evidence (at its worst for defendants) established that
the plaintiff could have brought in the road from the north
and thereby not interferred with the irrigation system of the
defendants at a cost of $9,300*

(R 236)

The testimony as

noted in our Statement of Facts established that by taking
a route somewhat closer to the hay field (that is toward the
east), the fill would not be required at all, an alternative
that the plaintiff didn't even consider.

The court was justi-

fied in finding from that testimony that the road could be
brought in from the north at substantially the same cost as
from the east.

The court was justified in finding that there

would have been no greater expense to the plaintiff as far as
graveling of either of the county roads was concerned.

(R 343)

Although at the trial, plaintiffs made an attempt to assert
they were open to negotiations and that there were noble motivations
for their conduct, however, it is clear from their testimony,
and the trial court was fully justified-in finding that there
was no real intent to negotiate on the road location with
the

defendants, and that the sole motivation of the plaintiff

in putting the road where it did was that it was the shortest
distance as noted, supra, in our Statement of Facts. Mr. Reese,
plaintiff's superintendent, so testified at page 310 of the
*Thus even under this version, such an expenditure is only a
little over 1/2 that required in Getty, and this would be
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record.

It should be pointed out that in the aforesaid Getty

case, the court held that the means chosen by the oil company
was unreasonable even though the alternative which the court
concluded was the reasonable alternative would necessitate
that the oil company incur an additional expense of $17,000.
And, therefore, it certainly cannot be said as a matter of law
that the trial court erred in finding that reasonable alternatives were available to the plaintiff as to the location of
the road.

It should also be noted that although plaintiff's

complaint was for injunctive relief, that matter was disposed
of by Judge Sorensen when he granted the restraining order and
limited the defendants to recovery of damages.

(R 46)

That

portion of the lawsuit then that was tried by Judge Bullock
was a suit for damages by defendants which is legal in nature
and not equitable.

That being the case, the Supreme Court

should view the evidence and the reasonable inferences that
can be drawn therefrom in the light favorable to the Findings
and Judgment of the trial court.

Phillips v. Putnam, 29 Ut 2d^29,

504 Pac 2d 1376 (1973) . If there is competent

evidence to sus-

tain the ruling of the trial court under applicable principles
of law, the Supreme Court should affirm the trial court.

See

Schlueter v. Summit County, 25 Ut 2d 257, 480 Pac 2d 140 (1971).
The favored position of the trial court in actually hearing the
witnesses and observing their demeanor bestows upon the trial
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court well-established prerogatives, and, of course, the
decision of the trial court is presumed to be correct.

See

Holley v. Federal-American Partners, 29 Ut 2d 212, 507 Pac 2d
381 (1973).
In the light of the foregoing rules of appellate review,
it seems clear that the evidence adduced at the trial not only
meets these standards, but is overwhelmingly in favor of the
trial court.
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POINT IV. THE SO-CALLED 60-DAY NOTICE PROVISION OF THE
OIL AND GAS LEASE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS
OF THIS CASE.
We do not consider the provisions of paragraph 13 of
the lease to be applicable to this case for the following
reasons:
1.

Plaintiff states at page 30 of its Brief:

"Respond-

ent has claimed damages alleging a breach of lessee's obligation
to act reasonably in locating its facilities and operating the
same."

The Brief then goes on to say that paragraph 13 requires

a 60-day notice of any claimed breach of contract by plaintiff.
We submit that this argument overlooks the fact that defendants'claim concerning the unreasonableness of plaintiff's conduct
is not based upon the lease, but rather upon the relative rights
existing between the surface owner and the mineral owner.

(As

to crop damage, defendant does indeed rely upon the lease, but
plaintiff does not assert in the Brief any failure on the part
of defendants to comply with paragraph 13 on the matter of crop damage.
2.

Plaintiff had ample notice of defendants' objections

to the proposed conduct of plaintiff before plaintiff acted.
Plaintiff's agents admitted that notice was given numerous times
by defendants of their objections, and still plaintiff persisted
in its course of conduct.

It is clear that it intended to pro-

ceed as it did in spite of defendants' protests, and defendants
are not required in any event to do a useless act.
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3.

Defendants1 objections as contained in files of this

action (which preceded its Counterclaim by more than 60 days)
would satisfy the requirements of paragraph 13, even if it
were applicable.

See, for example, defendants1 Motion to For-

feit Bond served on plaintiff's counsel on January 24, 1974,
(R 22) which was thus served many months prior to defendants1
Counterclaim, which was served in December of 1974.
4.

(R 53-56)

This defense of 60-days notice would be an affirmative

defense in any event and was not properly raised by plaintiff in
its Reply.
The testimony of the witnesses at the trial clearly shows
that the damage caused by the roadway and the well-site is permanent because of the compaction of the road and the destruction
of the ground under the well-site fill, and there would appear
to be no way for plaintiff to cure the damage which it has done
at this stage within 60 days or any other time.
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POINT V,

THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT RULE TO THE
FACTS OF THIS CASE EVEN THOUGH THE PHRASE
"POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE" WAS USED IN PARAGRAPH 3
OF THE COURT'S MEMORANDUM DECISION.

A fair reading of the trial court's Memorandum Decision
(R 64) and of the Findings of Fact (R 66-71) demonstrate that
the trial court understood and applied the rule of the Getty
case, even though the Court in paragraph 3 of the said Memorandum Decision used the phrase "possible alternative".

In

the Findings of Fact, the Court used the phrase "reasonable
alternatives" (see paragraph 6 thereof) and it is clear that
the trial court was at all times concerned with reasonableness
and intended that concept throughout as opposed to mere possibilities.

We view this objection as being trivial as well as

erroneous.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that the decision of the lower court is in accord with the facts
and the law and should accordingly be affirmed in all particulars.
Respectfully submitted:
Gordon A. Madsen
Robert C. Cummings
MADSEN & CUMMINGS
Attorneys for RespondentsDefendants
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